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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURRANT, Justice: 
*1 H 1 In this case, we must determine whether 
David Roger Markland's constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures was 
violated when a police officer detained him in order 
to run a five-minute warrants check. At issue is 
whether Markland's detention was justified by a 
reasonable suspicion that Markland had engaged, 
was engaged, or was about to engage in criminal 
activity. The district court concluded that 
Markland's detention was justified. However, in a 
2-1 opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that the detention was unlawful because the 
facts in the record did not support the conclusion 
that the detaining officer possessed the requisite 
degree of suspicion prior to initiating the detention. 
We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' 
decision. We now reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 At 3:14 a.m., Deputy Edward Spotten received 
a call from dispatch informing him that someone 
was "screaming or crying out for help" near the 
eastern end of the Bridgeside Landing apartment 
complex. Deputy Spotten arrived at the apartment 
complex within five minutes after hearing the 
report. Upon his arrival, Deputy Spotten proceeded 
to drive down a dead end street located on the east 
side of the complex. At that time, he observed 
Markland walking toward the dead end of the poorly 
lit street. Markland was carrying two over-the-
shoulder cloth bags and was the only individual 
Deputy Spotten noticed in the area. 
H 3 Deputy Spotten pulled his patrol car alongside 
Markland, exited the vehicle and, after informing 
Markland that there had been a report of screaming 
in the area, asked whether Markland had heard 
anything. Markland responded in the negative. 
Deputy Spotten then asked Markland where he was 
headed. Markland replied that he was walking 
home, which he stated was approximately twenty 
blocks away. Aware that the street on which 
Markland was traveling reached only a dead end, 
Deputy Spotten reasoned that Markland's present 
course would not lead him home. 
% 4 At that point, Deputy Spotten asked Markland 
for some identification and proceeded to run a brief 
warrants check. That check revealed an outstanding 
warrant for Markland's arrest. Deputy Spotten 
therefore arrested Markland and, in a search 
incident to that arrest, discovered drug 
paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and marijuana. 
K 5 The State charged Markland with two counts of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 
Markland, arguing that his detention during the 
warrants check was unlawful, moved to suppress the 
drugs discovered after his arrest. After a hearing, 
the district court denied the motion to suppress, and 
Markland appealed. 
K 6 In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals reversed 
the district court's ruling and held that Deputy 
Spotten's detention of Markland for the purpose of 
running a warrants check was not supported by a 
reasonable suspicion that Markland was connected 
to criminal activity. State v. Markland, 2004 UT 
App 1, K 9, 84 P-3d 240. The State petitioned this 
court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
2005 WL 858159 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 858159, *1 (Utah)) 
78-2- 2(5) (2002). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
*2 % 7 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the 
court of appeals and not that of the district court." 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, H 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
Our review is for correctness, and we grant no 
deference to the court of appeals' opinion. Grand 
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, U 6, 44 P.3d 734. 
As an essential component of this correctness 
review, we must determine whether the court of 
appeals applied the proper standard of review when 
considering the district court's ruling. Brake, 2004 
UT94at1J 11. 
H 8 In the present case, the court of appeals 
reviewed the district court's ruling for correctness, 
but it conducted that review "with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the 
legal standard to the facts." State v. Markland, 2004 
UT App 1, H 2, 84 P.3d 240 (internal quotation 
omitted). Subsequent to the court of appeals' 
decision in Markland, we released our opinion in 
Brake, which resolved apparent confusion as to the 
appropriate standard of review in the search and 
seizure context and expressly adopted non-
deferential review in such cases. Brake, 2004 UT 95 
at K 15 ("We abandon the standard which extended 
'some deference' to the application of law to the 
underlying factual findings in search and seizure 
cases in favor of non-deferential review."). 
K 9 As Brake makes clear, the court of appeals 
improperly granted deference to the district court's 
application of the law to the facts. Consequently, 
when undertaking our own review, we apply the 
proper, non-deferential standard. 
ANALYSIS 
TJ 10 The Fourth Amendment's protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures "extend to brief 
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall 
short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). However, it is settled 
law that "a police officer may detain and question an 
individual when the officer has reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or 
is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995) (internal 
quotation omitted). [FN1] In order to justify such a 
detention, the officer's suspicion must be supported 
by "specific and articulable facts and rational 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
inferences," United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 
1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990), and cannot be merely 
an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch,' " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
However, "[a] determination that reasonable 
suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility 
of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. 
Indeed, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not 
rise to the level required for probable cause, and it 
falls considerably short of satisfying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard." Id. at 274. 
FN1. Our case law has identified three permissible 
levels of police stops: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an articulable suspicion 
that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime ...; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe 
an offense had been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) 
(internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). 
In the present case, the parties agree that a level-
two stop commenced when Deputy Spotten 
requested Markland's identification for the purpose 
of conducting a warrants check. 
K 11 When reviewing a given factual situation to 
determine if reasonable suspicion justified a 
detention, "[cjourts must view the articulable facts 
in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide 
the facts and evaluate them in isolation." State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, fl 14, 78 P.3d 590. Courts 
must also "judge the officer's conduct in light of 
common sense and ordinary human experience and 
... accord deference to an officer's ability to 
distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
actions." United States v. Williams, 111 F.3d 1262, 
1268 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation and 
citations omitted); accord Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ffif 
20-21 (stating that courts should consider officers' 
subjective assessment of the facts). 
*3 \ 12 The parties to this appeal do not dispute the 
articulation of the law outlined above, nor do they 
dispute the relevant facts. Rather, they dispute 
whether the facts observed by Deputy Spotten gave 
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
criminal activity was afoot and that Markland was 
connected to that activity. 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
2005 WL 858159 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 858159, *3 (Utah)) 
U 13 The district court concluded that Deputy 
Spotten did have a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
and, in support of that conclusion, found the 
following facts: 
a) [Deputy Spotten] received a report that someone 
was crying for help five minutes earlier in the area 
where he found [Markland]. 
b) It was late at night and the area was not well lit. 
c) [Markland] was headed down a dead-end road 
where he could not get anywhere. 
d) [Markland] said he was going home to a 
location that he could not get to by traveling in the 
direction in which he was headed. 
e) [Markland] was carrying two bags with him. 
K 14 The court of appeals reversed the district 
court's ruling, stating that the facts, as found by the 
district court, were not constitutionally sufficient to 
justify Markland's detention because "Deputy 
Spotten did not testify that he had any suspicions of 
criminal activity concerning [Markland]." State v. 
Markland, 2004 UT App 1, K 7, 84 P.3d 240. 
According to the court of appeals, "the officers 
responded to a suspicious circumstances call, yet 
they did not observe, have knowledge of, or have 
suspicions about any crime that had been committed 
or was about to be committed, let alone any crime 
[Markland] had committed or was about to commit." 
Id. at % 8. The court of appeals further noted that the 
facts observed by Deputy Spotten "were at least as 
consistent with lawful behavior as with the 
commission of a crime." Id. at % 1 (internal 
quotation omitted). 
K 15 The State argues that the court of appeals 
misapplied previous case law in concluding that the 
detention was unconstitutional. Markland disagrees, 
contending that the court of appeals conducted the 
appropriate analysis. Markland further argues that, 
even if we conclude that reasonable suspicion did 
justify his detention, we can nevertheless affirm the 
court of appeals by holding that the warrants check 
exceeded the permissible scope of the detention. We 
will analyze each contention in turn. 
I. MARKLAND'S DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED 
BY REASONABLE SUSPICION 
U 16 Although we consider this a close case, we 
conclude that Deputy Spotten's detention of 
Markland was justified by a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that crime was afoot and that Markland 
was connected to that crime. The court of appeals, 
in reaching the opposite conclusion, unduly 
emphasized the possibility of an innocent 
explanation of the facts Deputy Spotten witnessed, 
and followed an overly formalistic approach to the 
type of testimony that an officer must supply in 
detention cases. 
U 17 As to the first point, it is settled law that an 
officer is not obligated to rule out innocent conduct 
prior to initiating an investigatory detention. United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); Illinois 
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). This is 
because the public interest in investigating criminal 
activity is sufficiently important to justify the 
minimal intrusion into personal security that such 
investigatory detentions entail. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 
273. 
*4 U 18 In its opinion, the court of appeals stated 
that " 'the facts known to the officers regarding [the 
defendant] were at least as consistent with lawful 
behavior as with the commission of a crime .' " 
State v. Markland, 2004 UT App 1, H 7, 84 P.3d 
240 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 
55, U 19, 998 P.2d 274). This language improperly 
imposes something akin to a preponderance of the 
evidence standard that officers must satisfy before 
initiating an investigatory detention. The United 
States Supreme Court has made it clear that such a 
standard is inappropriate in the investigatory 
detention context. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 
("[T]he likelihood of criminal activity need not rise 
to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of 
the evidence standard."). As a result, the court of 
appeals placed an improperly elevated burden on the 
State. That elevated burden, in turn, contributed to 
the court's incorrect conclusion that Markland's 
detention was unconstitutional. 
TJ 19 Additionally, the court of appeals put too great 
an emphasis on the fact that Deputy Spotten never 
testified as to what crime he suspected had been 
committed or how Markland was connected to that 
crime. In a sense, the court of appeals faults Deputy 
Spotten for not connecting his own testimonial dots. 
However, the Fourth Amendment does not demand 
such rigid formalities. As long as the underlying 
facts, and reasonable inferences drawn from those 
facts, justify the conclusion that reasonable 
suspicion existed at the inception of a level-two 
stop, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied. See United 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
2005 WL 858159 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 858159, *4 (Utah)) 
States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th 
Cir.1990) (stating that an investigatory detention "is 
justified when specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion" that crime is afoot 
(emphasis added)); see also State v. Warren, 2003 
UT 36, K 14, 78 P.3d 590 (stating that an officer 
"must be able to point to specific facts which, 
considered with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion" (emphasis 
added)). Although the connections that the court of 
appeals deems necessary may be absent from 
Deputy Spotten's express testimony, those 
connections can reasonably and rationally be 
inferred from the totality of facts to which Deputy 
Spotten testified. 
11 20 Deputy Spotten's testimony established that he 
arrived at the Bridgeside Landing apartment 
complex just after 3:00 a.m., only a few minutes 
after hearing a report that someone was "screaming 
or crying out for help" in the area. Upon his arrival, 
he observed only one individual, a man carrying two 
over-the-shoulder cloth bags, who was walking 
toward the dead end of a poorly lit street. At that 
point, reason demanded that Deputy Spotten initiate 
contact with the individual, the most apparent, and 
perhaps only, lead in his investigation into the 
unexplained screaming or crying for help. 
*5 T| 21 As a result, he began to question the 
individual, whose answers were inconsistent with 
the observable facts. This further heightened Deputy 
Spotten's suspicion of the already unusual nature of 
the individual's presence behind the apartment 
complex, far from his home, at so late an hour. In 
furtherance of his investigation, Deputy Spotten 
decided to momentarily detain the individual in 
order to run checks that could potentially provide 
information relevant to his investigation into the 
cries for help, as well as information relevant to 
Deputy Spotten's own safety, e.g., whether the 
individual had a record indicating prior violent 
behavior or a history of mental illness. We conclude 
that, viewing the facts in their totality and 
considering the rational inferences drawn from those 
facts, Deputy Spotten's detention of Markland in 
order to run a warrants check was justified at its 
inception by a reasonable suspicion that crime was 
afoot and that Markland was connected to that 
crime. 
©2005 Thomson/West. No Claim 
% 22 In reaching the opposite conclusion below, the 
court of appeals relied primarily upon two of its 
previous decisions, Ray, 2000 UT App 55, and State 
v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). 
However, both decisions are distinguishable from 
the present case. 
K 23 In Ray, officers detained a woman after 
receiving a call from a convenience store owner 
expressing concern that the woman in question had 
been in front of the convenience store for 
approximately two hours. 2000 UT App 55 at ffi[ 2-3 
. The store owner did not express any suspicion that 
the woman was somehow connected to past, present, 
or future criminal activity. Id. at K 2. The officers 
questioned the woman, who stated that she was 
waiting for a ride, and then asked for identification 
in order to run a warrants check. Id. at H ^ 4-5. The 
officers in Ray testified that they did not suspect the 
woman of any criminal activity when they took her 
identification in order to run a warrants check. Id. at 
15. 
K 24 In Trujillo, an officer detained three 
individuals who had been "peering" into store 
windows at approximately 3:30 a.m. 739 P.2d at 86. 
The court of appeals concluded that the only facts 
offered in support of the detention were the late 
hour, the fact that the individuals appeared nervous 
and were in a high-crime area, and the presence of a 
"suspicious" knapsack. Id. at 86, 89. Although the 
court concluded that the detention in that case was 
not justified by reasonable suspicion, it twice 
pointed out that the detaining officer had not 
received any reports of criminal activity in the area 
that day. Id. 
K 25 The present case is quite different from both 
Ray and Trujillo. Here, we are not dealing with a 
situation, as in Ray, where an officer admitted that 
he or she did not suspect criminal activity at the 
inception of a challenged detention. That distinction 
is fatal to any attempt to analogize Ray to the 
present case. The analogy to Trujillo is also 
imperfect because the officer in Trujillo lacked a 
critical fact present in this case: a contemporaneous 
report of suspicious circumstances in the area in 
which Markland was detained. [FN2] 
FN2. Markland argues that the cries for help could 
have been precipitated by noncriminal activity. 
That is certainly the case. However, the question is 
not whether a noncriminal explanation for the cries 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
2005 WL 858159 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 858159, *5 (Utah)) 
might exist, but whether Deputy Spotten could 
have reasonably suspected that criminal activity 
was afoot considering his knowledge of the 
reported cries for help and the additional 
information obtained during his subsequent 
investigation. The dissent argues that we should 
ignore the dispatch report when analyzing whether 
Deputy Spotten possessed reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. According to the dissent, reliance 
on the dispatch report is unwarranted because (1) 
the appellate record contains no facts relating to the 
reliability of the call precipitating the report, and 
(2) Deputy Spotten was unable to uncover 
information connecting Markland to the report. In 
support of the first proposition, the dissent cites a 
series of cases in which 911 calls or dispatch 
reports provided the sole basis for effecting an 
investigatory detention. In essence, the cases relied 
upon by the dissent stand for the undisputed 
principle that an investigatory detention cannot be 
justified by an unreliable or unsubstantiated 
dispatch report alone. However, in this case, the 
dispatch report served a different function: it 
justified the initiation of an investigation, not the 
initiation of an investigatory detention. As to the 
dissent's second proposition, we note that there 
was a connection between Markland and the 
dispatch call: Markland was the only individual 
Deputy Spotten observed in the relatively secluded 
area where the screams reportedly occurred, and 
Deputy Spotten found him in that area at an odd 
hour just five minutes after hearing the dispatch 
report. Deputy Spotten should not have been 
expected or required to completely ignore the 
suspicious backdrop provided by the dispatch 
report when investigating and evaluating the 
additional suspicious circumstances attendant to 
Markland's presence behind the apartment 
complex. Such an integral aspect of the officer's 
background knowledge cannot be excised from the 
reasonable suspicion determination. That said, we 
note that the dispatch report serves as only one of 
the five factors that the district court relied upon 
when upholding Markland's detention. Even in the 
absence of an unassailable, inculpatory connection 
between Markland and the dispatch report, we 
conclude that the report was properly weighed as a 
factor contributing to reasonable suspicion. 
*6 TI 26 When viewed in their totality, the facts of 
this case compel our conclusion that Deputy Spotten 
possessed reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot 
and that Markland, the sole individual he observed 
in the area, was connected to that crime. Having so 
concluded, we next address Markland's argument 
that we can nevertheless affirm the court of appeals 
by holding that the warrants check impermissibly 
exceeded the permissible scope of his detention. 
II. THE WARRANTS CHECK WAS WITHIN 
THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF MARKLAND'S 
DETENTION 
H 27 Markland contends that, under the 
circumstances of his detention, running a warrants 
check would not aid Deputy Spotten in either 
confirming or alleviating his suspicion about 
Markland's comiection to the reported cries for 
help. He argues that the drugs uncovered after his 
arrest should, therefore, be suppressed because they 
were obtained as the result of a warrants check that 
exceeded the permissible scope of his detention. We 
disagree. 
U 28 In upholding the constitutionality of a stop-
and-identify statute, [FN3] the United States 
Supreme Court recently granted implicit approval of 
the use of warrants checks when undertaken as part 
of a level-two detention, noting that "[k]nowledge of 
identity may inform an officer that a suspect is 
wanted for another offense, or has a record of 
violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, 
knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow 
the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere." 
Hiibelv. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 
2458 (2004). That pronouncement is not out of step 
with prior case law. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (stating that the 
ability to "check identification in the absence of 
probable cause promotes the strong government 
interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to 
justice"); United States v. Thompson, 282 F.3d 673, 
679 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that, under the 
circumstances, a warrants check taking 
approximately twenty minutes did not exceed the 
scope of an investigatory detention). 
FN3. Stop-and-identify statutes are typically hybrid 
statutes combining elements of vagrancy laws with 
language aimed at regulating police conduct during 
investigatory stops. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2456 (2004). 
K 29 Our own case law is similarly in accord with 
the view that the warrants check conducted by 
Deputy Spotten was within the permissible scope of 
Maryland's detention. In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1133 (Utah 1994), we explained that 
implementing general Fourth Amendment principles 
requires a balancing of the need to breach the wall 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
2005 WL 858159 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 858159, *6 (Utah)) 
of personal security with the extent of the particular 
invasion. In that case, we noted that "the 
government interest in arresting citizens who have 
outstanding warrants is substantial." Id. We then 
balanced that interest against the inconvenience 
occasioned by a warrants check, stating that "the 
impact of a warrants check on the scope of detention 
is minimal because computerized data storage 
renders the time for a records check negligible." Id. 
(internal quotation omitted). Consequently, in 
Lopez, we upheld the constitutionality of a warrants 
check in the course of a routine traffic stop so long 
as the check does not unreasonably extend the time 
of detention. Id. 
*7 K 30 Markland, without attempting to distinguish 
the case law cited above, refers us to State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995), which he 
contends controls the outcome in this case. In 
Chapman, an officer conducted checks on an 
individual detained on suspicion of violating a 
loitering ordinance and thereby discovered that the 
individual was a gang member known to carry a 
gun. Id. at 448. The officer obtained permission to 
search the vehicle in which the gang member was 
found, and discovered a gun stored in accordance 
with Utah law. Id. The officer then ran a stolen 
weapons check to determine whether the gun was 
stolen. Id. We held that the stolen weapons check 
was not properly related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the individual's detention-
specifically, suspicion of a loitering ordinance 
violation. Id. at 453. 
T| 31 Upholding the validity of the warrants check in 
the present case is wholly consistent with Chapman. 
In this case, Deputy Spotten did exactly what 
Chapman allows, namely-take steps to further 
investigate the suspected wrongdoing and protect 
officer safety. In Chapman, we concluded that the 
officer only strayed into unconstitutional territory 
when he ran the stolen weapons check, an action 
wholly unrelated to a suspected violation of a 
loitering ordinance and conducted in the absence of 
an articulable suspicion that the gun in question was 
stolen. Id. at 454. 
J^ 32 In the present case, there was no such 
overreaching by Deputy Spotten. The warrants 
check was adequately related in scope to the reasons 
justifying Markland's detention-specifically, Deputy 
Spotten's suspicion that Markland was connected to 
a crime relating to the reported screaming or crying 
for help. As previously noted, when an officer is 
conducting an initial investigation into criminal 
activity, a warrants check can quickly provide 
highly relevant information that serves to either 
heighten or alleviate the suspicion that originally 
justified the check. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 
761, 763-64 (Utah 1991) (quoting an officer's 
testimony indicating that a warrants check is a 
helpful investigative tool). Also, as noted above, a 
warrants check can prove invaluable to officer 
safety. 
U 33 In this case, the warrants check could have 
established that Markland had a history of violent 
crime, simultaneously bolstering Deputy Spotten's 
suspicion that Markland was connected to criminal 
activity and alerting Deputy Spotten that he was 
confronting a potentially violent individual. 
Conversely, if Deputy Spotten had discovered that 
Markland possessed no criminal background, his 
level of suspicion may have decreased to a point at 
which no further investigation into Markland's 
potential connection to the cries for help would be 
warranted. 
TI 34 The warrants check itself lasted approximately 
five minutes, a relatively minimal intrusion, and had 
the potential to reveal information relevant to 
Deputy Spotten's suspicion that Markland was 
connected to the cries for help. We therefore hold 
that the warrants check was within the permissible 
scope of Markland's detention. 
CONCLUSION 
*8 U 35 We conclude that the totality of the facts, 
combined with rational inferences drawn from those 
facts, gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that Markland was connected to the reported cries 
for help and, by rational inference, criminal activity. 
As a result, Markland's detention was 
constitutionally justified. We also conclude that 
Deputy Spotten acted within the permissible scope 
of the detention when he conducted a warrants check 
that had the potential to supply information relevant 
to the investigation that gave rise to Markland's 
detention. Given these conclusions, we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
T| 36 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice 
PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Justice 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
2005 WL 858159 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 858159, *8 (Utah)) 
DURRANT's opinion. 
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting: 
K 37 I respectfully dissent. This is indeed a close 
case but I am simply not persuaded that the officers 
had sufficient information to permit a lawful 
warrants check. My concern is that the majority 
opinion may be interpreted to mean that reasonable 
suspicion may be based on an ambiguous telephone 
report with no indicia of reliability and no 
corroboration that there is even criminal activity 
going on, let alone that the defendant is somehow 
connected to it. 
K 38 In most jurisdictions there appears to be no 
presumption that a call to police, even if it is a 911 
call, contributes to a police officer's reasonable 
suspicion. Rather, either the call itself must be 
highly reliable or the substance of the call must be 
somehow corroborated. See, e.g., United States v. 
Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.2004) 
("Provided Mr. Domingis's 911 call exhibited 
sufficient 'indicia of reliability,' it could have 
provided Officer Kulp with reasonable suspicion 
justifying a Terry stop."); United States v. Quarles, 
330 F.3d 650, 656 (4th Cir.2003) ("[T]he 911 call 
was not anonymous and provided sufficient 
information about [the caller] and about the 
defendant to find [the caller] credible and 
knowledgeable. We also believe that the 911 call 
provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify 
stopping the defendant."); United States v. Nelson, 
284 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir.2002) ( "[W]e assess 
whether the [telephone] communications to the 
police possessed sufficient indicia of reliability, 
when considering the totality of the circumstances, 
for us to conclude that the officers possessed an 
objectively reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify 
a Terry stop."); United States v. Jones, 242 F.3d 
215, 218 (4th Cir.2001) (holding an anonymous 911 
call that several black males were causing a 
disturbance did not justify police stopping a car 
containing black males). 
K 39 In line with these cases, this court has also 
analyzed dispatch calls to officers on patrol in order 
to determine whether the calls were sufficiently 
reliable to provide police with reasonable suspicion. 
In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), for 
example, we held that a dispatch call relaying 
information obtained from a 7-Eleven store clerk, 
who had reported a theft at the store and had 
described the suspect and his car, including its 
license plate number, did contain sufficient detailed 
information to justify police in making an initial stop 
of an individual matching the suspect's description. 
Id. at 934, 940; see also State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 
646, 650-51 (Utah 1989) (holding that police who 
received a radio bulletin were justified in stopping 
the car identified in the bulletin as long as the 
officers who had issued the bulletin originally 
possessed sufficient articulable facts to constitute 
reasonable suspicion). 
*9 K 40 Here, the only information about the call in 
the record is that the police received a report of the 
call from dispatch. Thus, in this case, it would be 
impossible to conduct the reliability analysis that is 
often used to analyze whether police are justified in 
relying on a call, either alone or in combination with 
other factors, as a basis for reasonable suspicion. 
Moreover, the police were unable to corroborate the 
report of a scream or cry for help with other related 
indications of criminal activity. 
T| 41 Thus, based on the record before us, all we 
have is an uncorroborated and, for all we know, 
anonymous call, in combination with completely 
unrelated "suspicious" behavior by someone who 
was not even identified by the caller as the possible 
perpetrator. An identity request for possible future 
reference was, I believe, permissible, but the 
warrants check was not based on reasonable 
suspicion. I would affirm the court of appeals. 
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